

Report of the working group to review ICSU's dues structure

presented by Martin Grötschel
Secretary of the International Mathematical Union

at the European ICSU members meeting 25th/26th
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
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The International Mathematical Union has no personal members. Its **Members** and **Associate Members** are countries. Each (Associate) Member country is represented through an **Adhering Organization**, which may be its principal academy, a mathematical society, its research council or some other institution or association of institutions, or an appropriate agency of its government.

Member Countries (67)

| | |
|-----------------------|------|
| Africa | (06) |
| America | (10) |
| Asia | (16) |
| Australia and Pacific | (02) |
| Europe | (33) |

Associate Members (02)

Affiliate Members (02)

Member Countries by groups

| | |
|------------|----|
| I | 31 |
| II | 13 |
| III | 05 |
| IV | 08 |
| V | 10 |

Data of October 2007



working group to review ICSU's dues structure: members

Members, appointed by ICSU:

- ▷ Steve Thompson (RSNZ, **Working Group Chair**)
- ▷ Ian Cooper (UK)
- ▷ Jan Joep De Pont (IUBMB)
- ▷ Martin Grötschel (IMU)
- ▷ Joseph O. Malo (Kenya)
- ▷ Wataru Nishigahiro (Japan)
- ▷ Yves Petroff (IUPAP)
- ▷ Donald Saari (USA)
- ▷ **Roger Elliott (ICSU Treasurer)**
- ▷ Bryan R. Henry (Chair, ICSU Committee on Finance)
replaced by John Jost
- ▷ **Thomas Rosswall (Executive Director)**



- ▶ ICSU Member dues are currently paid on the basis of voluntary adherence to one of **51 nominal categories**.
- ▶ In practice, what **category** National and Union Members find themselves in is largely governed by history and, in many cases it **no longer reflects either economic or scientific strength**.
- ▶ In contrast to ICSU, most international organizations **link their dues structure to an objective indicator, such as GDP** for a member nation or total budget for a member organization. Index-linking in this way increases both the stability and the transparency of the funding structure.



- ▶ In recent years a number of Members have begun to **question the dues structure of ICSU** and some have changed their payment categories.
- ▶ Such decisions have not necessarily been based on value for money assessments but rather have reflected other financial and policy considerations within the Member organizations. Such cases illustrate the vulnerability for ICSU of the current voluntary mechanism.
- ▶ However, it is also recognized that switching to an index-linked mechanism could result in a request for significant increases in subscriptions for some Members.
- ▶ Such a change would need to be carefully planned and could only be introduced after full consultation with Members.



The ICSU Executive Board proposed to the 28th General Assembly (October 2005) that a review of ICSU's dues structure be conducted over the next triennium, with a view to presenting a proposal to the next General Assembly for a revised structure. It was noted that such a review should include a full consultation with Members. Members unanimously supported the proposal and stressed the urgency of the review. The formal decision of the General Assembly was:

- ▷ “to request the EB to establish a Working Group, in full consultation with Members, to consider the member dues structure. The Working Group shall report back to the EB as soon as possible. The EB shall then submit the report and the EB's recommendation to the Members for a vote by whatever means it determines to be expeditious”

In the light of this decision, the following terms of reference for the review have been developed:



Terms of Reference

1. To fully **define the problems** with the current dues structure from the perspective both of ICSU and its Members (to include issues such as equity, transparency and sustainability);
2. to **consider potential alternative models** for determining dues, taking into account what other international governmental and non-governmental organizations do;
3. to **propose a more appropriate mechanism** for establishing the level of dues for
a) national Members, b) Unions and c) Associates;
4. to propose, as necessary, a mechanism for ensuring the **transition** from the current structure to the proposed new structure.



Implied Objectives for a new formula, which the WG discussed, were therefore:

- ▷ **Objective basis** for calculation of membership dues
- ▷ Increase **equity and transparency** of membership due payments
- ▷ Improve **sustainability** of ICSU and its budget so it can carry out strategic plans

Some Questions that were considered in decision-making:

- ▷ How do countries currently **decide** their **category**?
(Level of revenue, historical obligation, country economic performance or R&D investment, Union size)
- ▷ Would the number of **developing and developed countries** participating in each Union affect the amount that unions can pay?
- ▷ Would **categories** be suitable for all countries/unions?
- ▷ How do we **minimise** the number of entities that would be **disadvantaged**?

Benefits of a new formula could be:

- ▷ **More objective** - based on the country reality according to the UN assessment. The union membership could be based on budgetary expenses
- ▷ Membership due payments are **completely transparent** – members know what each country or union is paying and how it is derived
- ▷ ICSU can set a budget each year that it can be sure will be met with the revenue required, which decreases the chance for losses, **increases stability**.



I will not review all alternatives considered and the discussion that went on in meetings and by e-mail.

I focus on the final result:

Report to the ICSU Executive Board of the Working Group

to Review ICSU's Dues Structure

Dr Steve Thompson, New Zealand, Chair

20 March 2007



A snapshot of the size of ICSU's budget, which shows the contribution coming from members is at just over 60% of total.

ICSU's 2005 Budget

| | 2005, in € |
|---|------------|
| Total Income | 3,033,468 |
| Income from Membership Dues | 1,898,771 |
| Membership Dues as a % of Total Income | 62.59% |

Rough numbers to remember:

total ICSU Income: ~3 million €
Membership Dues: 60%-65% thereof



Working Group Objective

The overall objective is for ICSU's income **to cover its approved budget to carry out its strategic plan and activities**. Group members raised a number of issues which they saw as needing to be addressed.

- ▶ Early in the discussions, several members raised the possibility of **voting weighted by amount of dues paid**.
- ▶ Several members also expressed a wish to see some measures of **“value for money”** developed.

Neither of these issues is listed in the group's terms of reference, but the group did consider dues formulae which would be compatible with weighted voting as one form of equity.

- ▶ Discussions around voting/influence in ICSU, and “value for money” are seen as complex and important issues in their own right and are addressed in sections 4 and 5 of the report.



1.1. An Objective Basis for Calculation of Membership Dues

1. Should more transparency imply a mechanism whereby each ICSU member understands and agrees how the dues are computed?
2. Should payment in-kind or voluntary additional payments be recognized when calculating the full support provided to ICSU by members?
3. Should dues payments be simplified into “bands” or “steps” (there are 51 such bands in the current system)?



1.2. Equity and Transparency in Membership Dues

4. A concern was discussed concerning the **Union and National member balance**. Dues from the Unions account for some 8% of the ICSU income, but votes in ICSU's General Assembly are weighted to assign them 50% of the voting power. The importance of the Unions justifies a weighting of voting power, but **should it be 50-50?**
5. Current ICSU data show a trend-line whereby many **smaller National members pay more** than if their share were prorated to GDP, and **large members pay less**.
6. Is it equitable that **about two-thirds of ICSU's income comes from the dues** (plus a voluntary contribution from the USA) **paid by six National members**, but their **voice in decisions through votes is less than 4%?**



1.2. Equity and Transparency in Membership Dues

7. Current national funding cycles, and **national methods of funding** ICSU members may limit a National member's ability to change its future dues payments with any rapidity.

8. Which is the best **method of calculating dues**?

Three which come to mind are:

- Pro-rating to **GDP**;
GDP figures are widely available, but not necessarily the best theoretical basis.
- pro-rating to "**science expenditure**",
Linking dues to science expenditure is attractive in principle, but difficult to measure.
- payment by "**value for money**".
While some form of "value for money" pricing might ideally reflect market forces, its measurement would be the least transparent. (IMU example)

For example: can a transparent and predictable approach be devised using some sort of science index? Might the level of National dues best be correlated with whom the National body represents within ICSU? Should a country's expenditures for military and commercial development, for instance, be included if they do not contribute to the National body?



Which is the best method of calculating dues?

- ▶ Pro-rating to **GDP**:
GDP is the Gross Domestic Product. GDP data are easily available for all countries and are accurate for the major contributors to ICSU.
 - ▶ Should “raw GDP” be employed, or GDP at purchasing power parity (**ppp**), or a UN model, e.g. its “**assessed payments**” (which includes debt burden and low per capita income)?
- ▶ pro-rating to “**science expenditure**”:
E.g., add the expenditures on Higher Education R&D (**HERD**) and **GOVERD** (Government expenditures on R&D).
 - ▶ Example: For Finland this gives 1.1% of GDP. But Finland is a research intensive country, spending about 3.5% of its GDP on R&D in 2005. In other words, ignoring industrial R&D expenditures in Finland could provide a skewed picture of Finland’s scientific weight. A more serious problem is that, for more than half of ICSU’s members, HERD and GOVERD data are not available. This would make judgment of their scientific weight a guess at best.
- ▶ using payment by “**value for money**”:
Difficult to measure.



1.3. Sustainability of ICSU and its Budget

9. Does a system of voluntary dues create **potential budgetary instabilities** for ICSU?

Should any new system be **voluntary or compulsory**?

In addition to equity and transparency, there is the problem of sustainability of the dues structure, of the ICSU budget, and of members finding support for their dues.

10. Should any **“banded” system** of dues payments encourage or allow for **voluntary over-payments**?

11. Should a **cap be** set on contributions from those paying the highest contributions, or a **minimum** from those paying the lowest contributions?

How would caps and minima affect ICSU’s budget?



1.4. Working Group Objective

The main objective arising from the issues examined above was defined as:

Achieving long term equity in the dues structure, according to some measure of economic or scientific “weight” of members.

Subject to the new system being:

- ▷ **Able to meet ICSU’s approved budget requirements.**
- ▷ **Acceptable to current members.**
- ▷ **Simple in its calculation and application.**
- ▷ **Predictable, so that members could calculate their future payments with some certainty.**
- ▷ **Stable, so that year-to-year variability would be minimised.**
- ▷ **Phased in at a rate that would allow members’ adaptation and budgeting.**
- ▷ **Not a radical departure from the current system.**



1. A compulsory or voluntary system?
2. A compulsory minimum amount?
3. An option or incentive to pay more than the minimum?
4. How should Unions' votes relate to those of the National members?
5. Are different mechanisms needed for Unions and National members?
6. Should in-kind support also be considered and encouraged (eg. secondments, voluntary contributions)?
7. Should any voting be weighted according to category of payment?
8. Should the new system reflect some measure of the economic or scientific "weight" or influence of a member?
9. Should indicators be derived from quantitative data that are generally available and "objective"?
10. The model derived from these indicators should be clear and robust.
11. Should there be caps or minima on dues from high and low-dues members?
12. Can the new model take the existing model and transition arrangements into account?
13. How can we ensure that no member is inequitably disadvantaged by a new structure?



For national members, two versions of “weight” were given serious thought: a *financial indicator* and a *scientific indicator*. Various models for the calculation of dues were explored as follows:

National Members:

1. Dues based on a financial indicator

- a. raw (or ppp) GDP
- b. attenuated GDP - UN Assessments

2. Dues based on a scientific indicator

eg. OECD Governments’ expenditures on R&D with assumptions for those not covered by OECD figures.

- For stability, figures to be based on a rolling period (eg. Y-2 to Y-7)



Recommendations - that:

1. Dues be based on a model based on **raw GDP** figures. The GDP figures would be the average of the latest 3 years available (the Working Group used only 2005 GDP figures in their example calculations).
2. **10 bands** be used, rather than the current 51.
3. A **minimum payment of €1,000** be required.
4. A **cap** be placed on the top band amount (currently paid by the United States^[1]).
5. **In-kind contributions** to ICSU be encouraged and **recognised** in some way.

^[1] Note that the US already makes a voluntary contribution which brings its total payment in 2007 up to €480,999



Implications for National Members

Appendix 2 shows a member's current dues (col A), what it would pay (col E) if its share of ICSU's budget were pro-rated by GDP, and what it would pay if these shares were "rounded" into 10 bands of membership dues (col H).

Two examples, drawn from Appendix 2, would see

- ▶ Japan pay in a band of €200,000, up from its current €181,628;
- ▶ while Poland would pay €13,000, down from its current €13,472 – unless it voluntarily maintained its higher rate.
- ▶ More extreme rises are seen in the case of China, Mexico, Korea and Indonesia,
- ▶ while Russia, Sweden and Finland would see large decreases if they wanted to take advantage of them.

Appendix 2: Current (col A) and Example (col H) National Member Dues

| Column:- | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J |
|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|--|---|--------------|---|--|---|
| Member | 2007 Dues | Dues as % of total | Member GDP (recent year example) | GDP as % of total | Dues if pro-rated to GDP and fitted to ICSU budget | Difference between current and pro-rated Dues | Band Average | EXAMPLE Dues, 10 Bands using recent GDP | Difference between current and example dues (Column I – A) | Lower band Boundary - as GDP % of total - (Col D) |
| | € | % | US\$ billion | % | € | € | € | € | € | % |
| USA | 238,999 ^a | 12.86 | 12,455 | 29.19 | 542,359 | 303,360 | 542,359 | 440,000 ^a | 201,001 | ≥ 20 |
| Japan | 181,628 | 9.78 | 4,506 | 10.56 | 196,211 | 14,583 | 196,211 | 200,000 | 18,372 | ≥ 10 |
| Germany | 181,628 | 9.78 | 2,782 | 6.52 | 121,139 | -60,489 | 101,390 | 180,000 | -1,628 | ≥ 4.5 |
| China: CAST | 62,051 | 3.34 | 2,229 | 5.22 | 97,056 | 35,005 | | 180,000 | 117,949 | |
| United Kingdom | 181,628 | 9.78 | 2,193 | 5.14 | 95,475 | -86,153 | | 180,000 | -1,628 | |
| France | 181,628 | 9.78 | 2,110 | 4.95 | 91,889 | -89,739 | | 180,000 | -1,628 | |
| Italy | 117,444 | 6.32 | 1,723 | 4.04 | 75,030 | -42,414 | 75,030 | 120,000 | 2,556 | ≥ 3 |
| Spain | 27,762 | 1.49 | 1,124 | 2.63 | 48,931 | 21,169 | 48,746 | 50,000 | 22,238 | ≥ 2 |
| Canada | 62,051 | 3.34 | 1,115 | 2.61 | 48,561 | -13,490 | | 50,000 | -12,051 | |
| Brazil | 62,051 | 3.34 | 794.1 | 1.86 | 34,579 | -27,472 | 32,315 | 35,000 | -27,051 | ≥ 1 |
| Korea, Republic of | 7,538 | 0.41 | 787.6 | 1.85 | 34,297 | 26,759 | | 35,000 | 27,462 | |
| India | 62,051 | 3.34 | 785.5 | 1.84 | 34,203 | -27,848 | | 35,000 | -27,051 | |
| Mexico | 1,000 | 0.05 | 768.4 | 1.80 | 33,462 | 32,462 | | 35,000 | 34,000 | |
| Russia | 62,051 | 3.34 | 763.7 | 1.79 | 33,256 | -28,795 | | 35,000 | -27,051 | |
| Australia | 13,472 | 0.73 | 700.7 | 1.64 | 30,511 | 17,039 | | 35,000 | 21,528 | |
| Netherlands | 24,464 | 1.32 | 594.8 | 1.39 | 25,899 | 1,435 | | 35,000 | 10,536 | |
| Switzerland | 24,464 | 1.32 | 365.9 | 0.86 | 15,935 | -8,529 | 13,355 | 13,000 | -11,464 | ≥ 0.5 |
| Belgium | 24,464 | 1.32 | 364.7 | 0.85 | 15,882 | -8,582 | | 13,000 | -11,464 | |
| Turkey | 4,682 | 0.25 | 363.3 | 0.85 | 15,820 | 11,138 | | 13,000 | 8,318 | |
| Sweden | 56,996 | 3.07 | 354.1 | 0.83 | 15,420 | -41,576 | | 13,000 | -43,996 | |

[Report](#)



A Note on Alternatives

1. Following the group's initial calculations, shown in Appendix 2, some alternatives were suggested by individual members. The options they presented can be summarised as:
2. Move Japan from band 2 (€200,000) to band 3 (Germany, China, UK and France) at €180,000, but maintain 10 bands by simultaneously...
3. splitting band 8 into 8b (Malaysia to Peru, $\geq 0.10\%$) paying €4,000; and 8a (Ireland to Portugal), $\geq 0.15\%$ paying €8,000
4. Reduce band 3 (Germany, China, UK and France) from €180,000 to €150,000 (to be nearer to the band average of \$101,390)
5. Increase band 4 (Italy) from €120,000 to 128,000 and band 5 (Spain, Canada) from €50,000 to €64,000
6. Reduce band 5 (Brazil to Netherlands) from €35,000 to €32,000
7. Move Greece and South Africa from band 6 (€13,000) to band 7 (€8,000)
8. Reduce band 7 dues from €8,000 to €5,000
9. Move Serbia&Montegro to Lebanon from band 9 (€1,500) to band 10 (€1,000)



The group considered these alternatives, and those group members expressing an opinion preferred the recommendations as set out in Appendix 2.

While changes of this nature should indeed be considered, care should be exercised to avoid lobbying and fine tuning which, in the end, could destroy the original intent of banding.

It should also be noted that implementing such changes will alter (though not in a major way) the total sum accruing to ICSU.



2.2 ICSU Union Members:

Recommendations - that:

6: Four bands be created for Union dues, as above, and

7: Unions select their appropriate band based on their declared operating expenses over a rolling period of years according to each Union's own internal cycle of activity.

The bands were set as

≥ €1,000,000,

≥ € 400,000,

≥ € 100,000, and

< € 100,000.

Assignment of Unions to these bands is shown in column J. It is also proposed that Unions would select their appropriate band based on their declared operating expenses rather than being assigned to a band based on the information available to the ICSU Secretariat.

| Column:- | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J |
|---------------------------------|--------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|---|--|---|-----------------|-------------------------|--|--|
| Union Report | 2007 Dues | Dues as % of total | Union Operating Expenses | Operating Expenses as % of total | Dues in € if pro-rated to Operating Expenses | Difference between current and pro-rates | Band Average | EXAMPLE Band Dues | Difference between current and example band | Lower Band Boundary (see Col C) |
| | € | % | € | % | € | € | € | € | € | € |
| IUCr | 6,002 | 4.0% | 3,227,834 | 28.1% | 42,715 | 36,713 | 28,664 | 30,000 | 23,998 | ≥ 1,000,000 |
| IBRO | 2,043 | 1.3% | 1,663,286 | 14.5% | 22,011 | 19,968 | | 30,000 | 27,957 | |
| IUPAC | 24,464 | 16.1% | 1,606,995 | 14.0% | 21,266 | -3,198 | | 30,000 | 5,536 | |
| IAU | 11,275 | 7.4% | 787,867 | 6.9% | 10,426 | -849 | 8,307 | 7,000 | -4,725 | ≥ 400,000 |
| IUFRO | 2,043 | 1.3% | 467,558 | 4.1% | 6,187 | 4,144 | | 7,000 | 4,957 | |
| IUPAP | 13,472 | 8.9% | 375,063 | 3.3% | 4,963 | -8,509 | 2,539 | 2,500 | -10,972 | ≥ 80,000 |
| IUNS | 2,043 | 1.3% | 315,980 | 2.8% | 4,181 | 2,138 | | 2,500 | 457 | |
| IUGG | 13,472 | 8.9% | 303,308 | 2.6% | 4,014 | -9,458 | | 2,500 | -10,972 | |
| IUBMB | 3,583 | 2.4% | 301,016 | 2.6% | 3,983 | 400 | | 2,500 | -1,083 | |
| IUBS | 9,297 | 6.1% | 293,686 | 2.6% | 3,886 | -5,411 | | 2,500 | -6,797 | |
| IMU | 6,002 | 4.0% | 291,029 | 2.5% | 3,851 | -2,151 | | 2,500 | -3,502 | |
| IUGS | 9,297 | 6.1% | 278,446 | 2.4% | 3,685 | -5,612 | | 2,500 | -6,797 | |
| URSI | 4,682 | 3.1% | 231,463 | 2.0% | 3,063 | -1,619 | | 2,500 | -2,182 | |
| IUPHAR | 1,605 | 1.1% | 225,121 | 2.0% | 2,979 | 1,374 | | 2,500 | 895 | |
| IUPAB | 3,583 | 2.4% | 125,813 | 1.1% | 1,665 | -1,918 | | 2,500 | -1,083 | |
| ISPRS | 2,704 | 1.8% | 122,874 | 1.1% | 1,626 | -1,078 | | 2,500 | -204 | |



2.3 Scientific Associates:

Scientific Associates have paid US\$500 each since their introduction in 1990. In 2007 this will be paid in Euros. The group agreed the idea of one flat rate, but increased to a new minimum of €1,000 to cover ICSU's administrative expenses.

Recommendation 8: That the dues for Scientific Associates, be set at a new minimum level of €1,000.



2.4 Voluntary or Compulsory Dues?

Each member should pay at least as much as its category dues, but it is invited to maintain its old dues rate if it has paid more in previous years and to consider making in-kind contributions to ICSU. A lower bound on membership dues will increase the stability of ICSU's income. In the current system, every National member can choose its category unilaterally, and some members have decided to pay less than their share pro-rated by GDP. Members should no longer be able to downsize their dues payment, or take advantage of "free rides".

Recommendations - that:

9. **The new dues structure be regarded as a "lower bound" by each member, with higher voluntary payments being encouraged.**
10. **Members may voluntarily move to a higher subscription band.** (see IMU)



3. Transition to a New System

ICSU's terms of reference ask the Working Group to propose, as necessary, a mechanism for ensuring the transition from the current structure to the proposed new structure.

The group believes that, once adopted, one 3-year GA cycle should be sufficient to allow successful transition for most members. We briefly examined crawling pegs, limits on the *percentage* change per period, and limits on the *absolute* change per period for each member. All succumbed to the need for a transparent and easily-understood transition system. In the end we felt that, if any member wished to make a case to ICSU for special arrangements, then it would be free to present its reasoned arguments.

Recommendation 11: That the new mechanisms for National members, Unions and Associates become operative from 2012.



4. Dues, Voting and Influence in ICSU

Early in our discussions, the possibility was raised of **voting** or influence within ICSU **weighted in some way by amount of dues paid**. While this issue lay strictly beyond the terms of reference, it does of course have implications for equity in ICSU.

Influence within ICSU could be achieved in several ways, for example

- ▶ by permanent seats on Executive Board,
- ▶ appointments to committees and working groups, or
- ▶ when expressing a view during ICSU's triennial General Assembly.

Direct influence can also be expressed during General Assembly voting, where the current system allows for one National Member = one vote, and one Union = one vote, subject to a weighting so that National Members and Unions match each other in a 50:50 balance.

Thus, **weighted voting is an accepted part of ICSU's procedures**.



4. Dues, Voting and Influence in ICSU

Nevertheless, voting related to dues payment has not been the norm within ICSU, neither was development of a voting scheme part of the terms of reference of this Working Group. The possibility does link to a dues structure in terms of equity, and most (not all) group members proposed

- ▶ that any proposed dues structure should couple voting (and influence within ICSU) with dues levels.

Several group members did not wish to see one part of the proposal to be separated from the other.



4. Dues, Voting and Influence in ICSU

During the Working Group's discussions, individual members made the following points:

1. Most, but not all, group members thought that the **number of votes** assigned to each National member should be **correlated in some way with level of dues paid**. It also was recognized that care must be exercised. With a linear correlation between dues and votes, for instance, the National member making the largest contribution would have 400 times more votes than some small members. This was viewed as unacceptable, so one challenge was to find ways to combine the number of assigned votes with non-voting ways to increase the "influence" of those members making larger contributions.
2. Several saw **weighted voting as essential**, while others saw it as a **possible option**. ICSU's highest paying members needed a value-added incentive (more influence in ICSU matters). However the weighting would not be linear. A weighted voting system might also encourage **over-contributions**, i.e., members could voluntarily decide to pay over their scale fee and have consequent additional voting power.



4. Dues, Voting and Influence in ICSU

3. It was noted that connecting the number of votes and level of dues might help gain support, hopefully sustainable support, from **funding agencies**.
4. Each band would carry an equivalent voting power, i.e., band ten – the highest band would carry ten votes and the minimum payment, band one – one vote. **(My personal favourite!)**
5. The group also proposed that votes be assigned based on the amount of Union dues paid. A simple assignment of four votes to the highest band and one less vote to each lower band was proposed.
6. Such a **banded system for National members and Unions** would change the balance of GA votes from the current 50:50 to approx **70:30**, which the group felt merited debate, given the ratio of 92% to 8% in income received from dues from the two groups of members.



4. Dues, Voting and Influence in ICSU

This group was formed by, and reports to, the Executive Board. There is no doubt that a majority of the members who expressed their views on the subject are committed to the view that dues and voting are inseparably linked. This report therefore brings the matter to the attention of Executive Board for their views on the issue, and by what process might it best be addressed.

Recommendation 12: That the Executive Board give serious consideration to the Working Group's views on voting, and determine by what process the issue might best be addressed.

Remark: The opinion on this issue was unanimous - with the exception of the two ICSU officers who were committee members.

At this point, it became clear to me that it is quite strange that two ICSU officers were members of the committee. Concerning this issue they tried to influence the other members considerably but never really provided reasons for their opinion.



4. Dues, Voting and Influence in ICSU

In fact, the e-mail discussion was quite heated. One example:

MG to RE: Back to your major point, your disagreement with the suggestion to change the one member one vote method to a differential voting system. My answer is: what is a committee like ours good for? If a committee is supposed to anticipate, in every possible detail, what the EB is about to say, then I do not see any purpose to ask a committee to propose some new dues mechanism. Let some slaves do the job, and do not waste the committee members' time!

I believe that we have agreed on a subtle reorientation of ICSU decision structure. And I repeat that almost all members of the committee considered differential voting as a good idea because we can keep the big contributors happy by giving them more influence. For me it is perfectly ok, if the EB rejects that proposal. The EB is in power. But the EB is confronted with a proposal and has to come up with better arguments with its own dues mechanism.



4. Dues, Voting and Influence in ICSU

RE to MG: I was trying to alert the group to the strong opposition voiced at the EB and suggested that we look for a "version" which might gain wider support than the 10 to 1 range we came up with. As to procedure I am sure that the Committee's Report will go unbowdlerised to the Members. It has a much better chance of being accepted if it is endorsed by the EB, but this may need some compromise on this issue.

Committee member: I am in total agreement with Martin's comments. ... In my mind, the committee at least tacitly agreed that we would not make any recommendation from which items could be picked and selected; we would be making recommendations about a package, and this included combining dues and votes. But I am bewildered; how and why can the EB be evaluating our recommendations/report or whatever when we have yet to make any formal recommendations?



5. Value for Money

Value for money can be seen from one standpoint as the chance to influence the workings of an organization, such as some of the items mentioned above: places on committees, voting power, moral suasion influence and the like. It can also be seen as ensuring that a methodology is in place to show how members benefit from membership of ICSU and how ICSU could demonstrate value for money to its members. The notion might also arise as to how members might best use and support ICSU as their voice in the international arena.



5. Value for Money

In recent years, ICSU has negotiated and put in place its first strategic plan. A natural progression from such a plan is its evaluation, and strategic plans are often followed by performance indicators and evaluations. Such evaluations, with regular reporting back to members and the General Assembly would provide the necessary accountability link from ICSU to its “shareholders”.

The Working Group appreciates that **indicators are notoriously difficult to pin down**, and even more difficult at the international levels of general influence that ICSU works at. Nevertheless, the group does recommend that ICSU secretariat develop and propose a methodology for approval by its Executive Board and adoption by the General Assembly.

Recommendation 13: That ICSU secretariat develop and propose a methodology to monitor and evaluate implementation of its strategic plan, for approval by its Executive Board and adoption by the General Assembly.



Summary of Recommendations

National members:

1. Dues be based on a model based on raw GDP figures. The GDP figures would be the average of the latest 3 years available (the Working Group used only 2005 GDP figures in their example calculations).
2. 10 bands be used, rather than the current 51.
3. A minimum payment of €1,000 be required.
4. A cap be placed on the top band amount (currently paid by the United States).
5. In-kind contributions to ICSU be encouraged and recognised in some way.

Unions:

6. Four bands be created for Union dues
7. Unions select their appropriate band based on their declared operating expenses over a rolling period of years according to each Union's own internal cycle of activity.

Associates

8. The dues for Scientific Associates be set at a new minimum level of €1,000.



Summary of Recommendations

All Members

9. The new dues structure be regarded as a “lower bound” by each member, with higher voluntary payments being encouraged.
10. Members may voluntarily move to a higher subscription band.

Transition:


11. The new mechanisms for National members, Unions and Associates become operative from 2012.

Voting and Influence:

12. The Executive Board give serious consideration to the Working Group’s views on voting, and determine by what process the issue might best be addressed.

Value for Money:

13. ICSU secretariat develop and propose a methodology to monitor and evaluate implementation of its strategic plan, for approval by its Executive Board and adoption by the General Assembly.



Report of the working group to review ICSU's dues structure

Martin Grötschel
Secretary of the International Mathematical Union

Thanks for your attention

International Mathematical Union (IMU)

<http://www.mathunion.org>



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